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In our everyday life we often have to make decisions with uncer-
tain consequences, for instance in the context of investment
decisions. To successfully cope with these situations, the ner-
vous system has to be able to estimate, represent, and eventually
resolve uncertainty at various levels. That is, not only are there
different forms of uncertainty with different consequences for
behavior and learning but research indicates that the processing of
uncertainty highly depends on situation and context. The present
research topic includes both review and original research articles
that seek to shed light on the neural processes underlying decision
making under uncertainty with a particular focus on situational
and contextual influences.
First, Bland and Schaefer (2012) review the diverse (and
often overlapping) definitions of uncertainty. They identify three
main forms—expected uncertainty (including risk), unexpected
uncertainty and volatility—and review theoretical and empir-
ical evidence that supports this dissociation. Several original
research articles then aim to either directly compare different
forms of uncertainty or to identify further dissociations within
these forms. Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts (2012) systemati-
cally vary unexpected and estimation uncertainty to study what
drives exploration (as opposed to exploitation). They report
that humans both seek out new reward opportunities (“curiosity
motive”) and avoid the unknown (“cautiousness motive”), result-
ing in exploration and exploitation, respectively. O’Reilly (2013)
addresses the same forms of uncertainty in the context of learning
with a particular focus on how an organism should adapt their
rate of learning in changing environments. Hansen et al. (2012)
on the other hand show that decisions made under perceptual vs.
categorical uncertainty are differentially affected by prior knowl-
edge such that prior knowledge increases visual cortical activity
when uncertainty is driven by the sensory stimulus itself rather
than at the cognitive level.
The next set of papers explores situational and contextual
aspects of expected uncertainty. First, Studer et al. (2012) demon-
strate that neural responses in a distributed network of choice
under risk increase when subjects actively choose a risky gamble
as opposed to being passively exposed to risk when a computer
chooses that gamble. Kim et al. (2012) study what information
decision makers attend to when either choosing between two lot-
teries or betting on a single lottery. Using eye-tracking data they
observe task-dependent attentional shifts from probabilities to
amounts which may influence the (neural) computation of value.
Consequently, individuals often chose options with higher prob-
abilities but place higher bids on options with higher amounts.
Schönberg et al. (2012) used the Balloon Analog Risk Taking task
to study the neural network underlying naturalistic risk-taking.
They find that brain activity in a network previously related
to risk increases as individuals continue to inflate a balloon—
thus, increasing their risk—while activity in a value-related brain
region decreases at the same time. Levin et al. (2012) then review
the literature on how risk processing differs between the gain
and loss domain. They argue that different neural systems indi-
cate different neural and psychological processes for risk-taking
in gains and losses. Finally, Heilbronner and Hayden (2013)
round off this set of papers by providing an account of risk-
seeking behavior. While risk-seeking is usually observed in only
a minority of human study participants, it is the dominant form
of risk preference observed in monkey studies. Heilbronner and
Hayden review the literature on this phenomenon and argue
that monkeys aren’t risk-seeking per se but are driven toward
risk-seeking by experimental design and training and that under
similar conditions rats and humans would behave the same way.
Finally, a third set of papers represents an increasingly fertile
area of research by connecting risk-taking to the social contexts
and affective processes underlying behavior. Tang et al. (2011)
report that socially anxious individuals demonstrate decreased
risk aversion and that the degree of social anxiety correlates with
activity in anterior insula. Jung et al. (2013) compare the number
of risky choices participants made for themselves or for others.
They find that at low probabilities subjects are less risk taking
for own decisions as opposed to high probabilities where the
effect is reversed. This difference in preferences toward risk is
underlined by partially distinct neural networks that are recruited
when choosing for oneself or for others. Using a model-based
approach, Zhu et al. (2012) connect social risk and learning, and
demonstrate that age-related differences in social learning can
be succinctly captured by a set of models widely used in eco-
nomics. Gaertig et al. (2012) use an ultimatum game to show that
positive social information about the proposer increases accep-
tance rates by the responder. This effect was further enhanced
by the presence of uncertainty. Finally, Wu et al. (2012) provide
an affective neuroscience account of decision making under risk
thereby connecting the quantitative approach of economic and
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FIGURE 1 | Activation Likelihood Estimate (ALE) meta-analytic maps for high versus low mean, variance, and skewness. ALE of mean: bilateral NAcc.
ALE of variance: bilateral anterior insula. ALE of skewness: left NAcc. (based on Wu et al., 2012).
financial theories with the psychological approach which focuses
on emotion and cognition.
In sum, the papers presented in this research topic demon-
strate several points: First, to fully understand decision making
under uncertainty one has to first dissociate different forms
of uncertainty. Each form impacts behavior and learning in a
different way (Figure 1). Second, choices under each form of
uncertainty can itself be impacted by situational and contextual
factors. Third, social context is an important source of uncer-
tainty that is often driven or influenced by affective processes. We
can further contend that risk remains the most popular and most
powerful form of uncertainty for studying choice under uncer-
tainty. The quantitative framework provided by choice under
risk allows the careful study of the impact of situational and
contextual factors on preferences and choice. However, as most
situations in real life are infused with unexpected uncertainty and
volatility rather than expected uncertainty (risk), future research
will show how the factors identified in this issue influence other
forms of uncertainty, to which degree common mechanism exist
and how they can account for the various influences identified
so far.
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